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Abstract 
This study provides new evidence on the impact of national culture on venture capital activity. The previous 
literature examining the relationship between national culture and domestic VC activity is very limited. 
However, national culture has been found to influence economic and management behaviors (Hofstede, 1980, 
2001). Therefore, it is presumable, that culture influences the two major determinants of venture capital 
activity; entrepreneurial activity and access to venture capital financing. 
I examine the effect of Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions, power distance, individualism, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and indulgence. I find that feminine culture is associated with 
higher level of VC activity. Consistent with Li and Zahra (2012) I also find, that uncertainty avoidance and 
collectivism are negatively associated with VC activity. Furthermore, I build a framework (Figure 9) through 
which further research could be executed by exploiting the framework and path analysis technique. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The notion of creative destruction of economy was introduced already in the 1930s by Joseph Schumpeter 
(McCraw, 2009). His notion strongly focuses on new innovative enterprises and the renewal of the whole 
economy, which further pinpoints the financing bottle neck of this renewal process. Previous literature 
indicates that access to finance is a major determinant of economic growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck 
et al., 2000; Claessens and Tzimouis, 2006). Here the venture capital (VC) market plays a key role. 
Venture capitalists (VC) are specialized financial intermediaries who combine their unique mix of experience 
in business and technology and financial resources, to provide both financial and managerial support for 
innovative entrepreneurs (Hain et al., 2016). It has been established by extensive research that venture capital 
not only promotes innovative activities (Kortum and Lerner 2000; Samila and Sorenson 2010, 2011) but it also 
contributes to enabling innovative products and services to be rapidly brought to the market (Black and Gilson 
1998; Bygrave and Timmons 1992). It is therefore, not surprising, that the creation of thriving venture capital 
markets has become an essential goal of several emerging and developed economies. 
 
However, the level of VC activity varies substantially across countries (e.g. Wright et al., 2005). Countries 
such as the United States, China, Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom have been able to develop 
extremely large and flourishing venture capital markets, as opposed to other countries having only very little 
venture capital activity compared to their economy-size. Could the differences between national cultures 
explain a part of this phenomenon? Several research papers have found that Geert Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions influence economic behavior and entrepreneurial and innovative activity (e.g. Hofstede, 1980, 
2001 and McGrath, MacMillan & Scheinberg, 1992 and Shane 1992, 1993). It is therefore possible and 
interesting to examine, whether national culture supports and hinders the development of venture capital 
markets in different countries. 
Previous research has examined the effect of Hofstede’s two cultural dimensions: Individualism versus 
collectivism (IDV) and Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) on venture capital activity within a country. This 
literature shows that uncertainty avoidance and collectivism influence venture capital activity negatively. (Li 
and Zahra, 2012) 
Additionally, Aggarwal and Goodell (2014) have found a significant effect of femininity and uncertainty 
avoidance on the access of venture capital financing relying on executive opinion surveys.  
However, the amount of research exploring the effect of national culture on domestic VC activity is still 
limited. Furthermore, the effects of the Hofstede’s remaining four cultural dimensions, Masculinity, (MAS) 
Power distance, (PDI) Long-term orientation (LTOWVS) and Indulgence versus restraint (IVR) on the 
domestic VC activity have not yet been researched. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze how these six cultural dimensions contribute to domestic VC activity. The 
applied empirical evidence covers 67 countries and six cultural dimensions. Throughout the thesis, I test 5 
different hypotheses. These hypotheses seek to examine the influence of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions on 
domestic VC activity. 
The results of this paper indicate, that femininity is associated with a higher level of VC activity. Additionally, 
the results are somewhat consistent with Li and Zahra (2012), adducing the negative relationship between 
uncertainty avoidance and collectivism and VC activity. 
The paper is organized as follows: after the introduction in section 2 I go through the prior research on this 
topic. In section 3 I present the theory related to the research topic and build my hypotheses. In section 4 I 
present the data and its descriptive statistics and the methodologies that I use in the research. In section 5 I 
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present the results and address robustness. Section 6 concludes the paper, and section 7 suggests directions for 
further research. Section 8 provides the references. Section 9 shows the appendices. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
The previous research examining the relationship between national culture and VC activity focuses mainly on 
cross-national venture capital deals. This growing body of research focuses on the cultural disparity between 
the company receiving finance and the VC. Dai and Nahata (2016) study VC syndication and find that when 
the foreign lead VC syndicates with VCs from culturally similar countries, the local VC involvement increases. 
Furthermore, Hain et al. (2016) find trust to mitigate the negative effects of geographical and cultural distance 
in cross-border VC deals.  
However, this paper seeks to examine the influence of national culture on the country’s VC activity, not the 
influence of cultural disparity on cross-border VC deals. The research that examines the impact of national 
culture on VC activity within a country, generally focuses on only a few cultural dimensions. It has been 
established through earlier research, that some of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions do influence VC activity 
within a country. It has been found that uncertainty avoidance is negatively related to VC activity (Li and 
Zahra, 2012) and access to VC finance (Aggarwal, and Goodell, 2014). Both these research papers show a 
statistical significance at 1% level for uncertainty avoidance. Furthermore, the level of VC activity for 
individualist countries is higher than those of more collectivist countries at 1% level of statistical significance 
(Li and Zahra, 2012). High power distance has additionally been negatively associated with national innovation 
rates (Hayton et al, Shane 1992). 
Nevertheless, Aggarwal and Goodell do not find a statistically significant effect of power distance or 
individualism on access to finance. However, they find that femininity is associated with a better access to 
overall financing and VC financing with a 10% significance level. (Aggarwal and Goodell, 2014) 
Unfortunately, there are no research papers that would focus on domestic, “unicultural”1 deals and take into 
account all six of the cultural dimensions. Also, there are no research papers on even all the four major cultural 
dimensions (pdi, idv, mas, uai) and their relation to VC activity. 
What is more, the amount of research exploring the effect of national culture on domestic VC activity is still 
very limited. Additionally, the effects of the Hofstede’s remaining four cultural dimensions, Masculinity, 
(MAS) Power distance, (PDI) Long-term orientation (LTOWVS) and Indulgence versus restraint (IVR) on the 
domestic VC activity have not yet been researched. From a broader perspective, researchers have found 
relations between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and entrepreneurial activity. (Hayton et al., 2002)
                                                          
1 I define unicultural VC deal by having at least one domestic VC involved in the VC investment. Thus, the national culture of the 
startup receiving financing can be expected to be represented in the deal making process. 
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3. Theory and hypotheses 
3.1. Background of VC activity 
The framework illustrated in Figure 1 demonstrates the determinants 
influencing venture capital activity within a country. 
The level of venture capital activity has two major determinants which 
influence it. Firstly, entrepreneurial activity and innovative ventures affect 
the size of a VC market. Secondly, access to venture capital financing 
influence the size of a VC market. This dependency is demonstrated in Figure 1. 
In the following I am going to examine these two determinants and their 
relation to national culture in depth. 
3.2. Entrepreneurial activity and innovative ventures in relation to culture 
There are several variables that influence entrepreneurial activity. Some of these variables are related to the 
economy, regulation, personality or cultural and societal differences. 
Culture is the foundation of ideology - the subjective model that people use to explain the world around them 
(North, 1990). According to Huntington (2000), it includes the set of shared values, attitudes, beliefs, and 
underlying assumptions prevalent in a society.  
Culture acts as a moderator in the relationship between contextual factors e.g. business regulations (Urban, 
2007) and formal institutions (Li and Zahra, 2012) and entrepreneurial outcomes. According to Urban (2007), 
“Culture acts as a catalyst, rather than a causal agent of entrepreneurial outcomes.” 
A multitude of studies support the argument that cultural values impact on entrepreneurial activity. According 
to Hofstede (1980, 2001) national culture influences a variety of economic and management behavior. 
Furthermore, according to McGrath et al. (1992) national culture influences entrepreneurship. Investigating 
entrepreneurship in the USA over time, Boyd (1990) finds, that some individuals with different cultural roots 
tend to be more prolific in initiating ventures. 
Furthermore, culture influences the status attached to entrepreneurs. (Bruton et al., 2005) For example, in the 
USA entrepreneurs are held in high status, but they are valued a lot less in some European countries. (Reynolds 
et al., 2000) In fact, in some European countries, the entrepreneur is generally perceived as an opportunist. The 
effect of this cognitive institution on the supply of entrepreneurs has already been discovered (Kuemmerle, 
2001).  
Cultural values indicate the degree to which a society considers entrepreneurial behaviors, such as risk taking, 
independent thinking and innovation, to be desirable. Cultures that value and reward such behavior support a 
tendency to introduce and develop radical innovation, whereas cultures that reinforce conformity, group 
interest and control over the future are not likely to show risk taking and entrepreneurial behavior. (Hayton et 
al., 2002) Previous literature has found evidence on the relationship of national culture and innovation. 
Individualism has been found to be positively associated, and power distance negatively associated with 
national innovation rates (Shane 1992). 
Based on extensive previous research on culture, the role of cultural values in the equation of increased 
entrepreneurship is founded on Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions of national culture. Although Hofstede (2001) 
did not fully unveil the linkage between culture and entrepreneurship, his dimensions are, however useful in 
identifying criteria of culture related to entrepreneurship. 
Figure 1. The major 
determinants of venture capital 
activity 
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3.3. Access to VC financing and culture 
The second determinant, access to VC financing is also influenced by several factors. As presented by Raja 
and Zingales (2003), access to finance is essential for the economic renewal and the creative disruption related 
to it. Easy access to finance allows new firms to emerge which can compete with prevalent companies. This 
competition makes the economic system more vital and the markets more efficient. As discussed in section 2, 
Aggarwal and Goodell find relationships between Hofstede’s dimensions and access to VC finance. (Aggarwal 
& Goodell, 2014)  
3.4. Problems related to VC: asymmetric information, principal-agent 
problem and adverse selection 
The channeling of funds from savers to borrowers or entrepreneurs is a crucial function in all countries. It is 
primarily undertaken through financial institutions and/or financial markets. Each financing channel must 
resolve the issues of asymmetric information, adverse selection and agency costs involved in financing 
contracts that cover the monitoring and collection of funds provided by savers to investors. (Aggarwal and 
Goodell, 2014)  
For venture capitalists these problems are pronounced. This is due because the new startup companies seeking 
VC financing tend to have little or no track record, they tend to be highly risky and have little historical data. 
(Aggarwal and Goodell, 2014) Additionally, the innovation or business idea for which the startup is seeking 
financing is often new and there is little or no track record of its feasibility and attractiveness for its end-users 
or its marketability in the markets.  
Due to these reasons, the information asymmetry between the VC and the startup is larger than e.g. in 
traditional bank loans issued for older companies. The representatives of the startup are, however most likely 
receiving some sort of information, positive and/ or negative feedback, through the responses they receive for 
their product or service offering, once they contact different agents in the markets, while trying to enlarge and 
spread out/ distribute their offering to the larger market. This information, especially and mostly when 
negative, however, usually remains inside the startup, and it will rarely be shared with the VC’s representatives. 
This enhances the adverse selection and high risk that comes with VC investing. For the VC and the startup to 
reach a deal, it is for the above-mentioned reasons important, that the communication between them is based 
on trust and is as open as possible. 
Open communication and active cooperation are important in financial contracting. According to Aggarwal 
and Goodell (2014): “Given that all optimal contracts are incomplete, the efficacy and efficiency of 
overcoming contracting costs depends on the ability and willingness of the contracting parties to try and take 
advantage of each other. Such ability and willingness depend not only on industrial structure and the legal 
environment, but also on ethical and other informal conventions reflected in social and cultural values that 
differ from country to country.” Conclusively, these cultural and social values and dimensions are reflected in 
the nature of financial intermediation in different countries. 
All in all, it is clear from this discussion that the emergence of venture capital activity requires trust, open 
communication and is affected by cultural dimensions. Indeed, the nature of financial intermediation in various 
countries reflects its cultural and social values. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the emergence of risky VC 
deals is likely to vary internationally based on similar factors. 
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3.5. Building hypotheses: Hofstede’s cultural dimensions’ relation with VC 
activity 
In order for us to understand the starting point of this research, we need to establish what the six cultural 
dimensions discovered by Geert Hofstede in fact represent. Below, I discuss all the six cultural dimensions 
and conduct five hypotheses. 
PDI – Power distance 
“Power distance has been defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of the society; of 
organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. This represents inequality, 
but it is defined from below, not from above.” (Hofstede, 2011). “People in societies exhibiting a large degree 
of power distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and which needs no further 
justification.” (Hofstede Insights, 2018) Consequently, it can be expected that in high PDI countries, it is less 
common, that people with less power will aspire to initiate innovative ventures and approach people with 
power and financial resources. Presumably in countries with high PDI the societal structures hinder the 
possible encounters between possible young and less wealthy entrepreneurs and more wealthy and powerful 
venture capitalists.  
In societies with high power distance, corruption is frequent and autocratic governments based on co-optation 
are common, and they are often changed by revolution. This could indicate a lower rank on political stability 
too and affect the level of VC activity adversely. (Hofstede, 2011) 
According to Hofstede’s extensive research, power distance is higher for East European, Latin, Asian and 
African countries and lower for Germanic and English-speaking Western countries and Nordic countries. 
(Hofstede, 2011) 
In societies that score high in power distance, older people are both respected and feared. (Hofstede, 2011) 
Since most of the VC investors and business angels are older members of the society and the startup 
entrepreneurs often younger people, high power distance could hinder the growth of VC investments. 
Based on the above explained argumentation, I conduct a hypothesis: 
H1: Hypothesis 1. The higher the level of power distance, the less VC activity there is within the country.  
IDV - Individualism vs collectivism  
Individualism – collectivism dimension is the degree to which people in a society are integrated into groups. 
A high score in this dimension reflects individualism, and low score collectivism. In collectivist societies 
relationship prevail over task. (Hofstede, 2011) Previous research has established that collectivism indicates a 
tendency to depend on in-group informal relationships (rather than formal institutions) in mitigating 
transaction problems. Consequently, collectivist orientation can restrict the development of formal institutions, 
limit venture capitalists’ deal flow to those connected to their existing network and exclude potential venture 
capitalists from joining the network and investing. (Li and Zahra, 2012)  
Individualism tends to prevail in developed and Western countries, while collectivism prevails in less 
developed and Eastern countries; Japan takes a middle position on this dimension. (Hofstede, 2011) Asian 
countries such as South Korea and China have highly collectivist national cultures and are known for their 
institutional logics; connectedness and relationships, different from Western economies. (Biggart and 
Hamilton, 1992) Gaunxi is an example of this visible idiosyncrasy in China. Additionally, it has been found 
that social networks initially rose in response to the absence of strong legal traditions. The relationships and 
connections provided by the network are an alternative means to enforce contracts or sanction violators. 
(Perkins, 2000) 
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Bruton et al. (2005) conclude, that a moderate level of social networks is likely to support a country’s economy. 
Nevertheless, they highlight, that a high level of social networks, especially if these networks are difficult to 
join, is a major barrier to VC. 
Based on previous literature, I conduct a hypothesis: 
H2: Hypothesis 2. The higher the level of individualism, the more VC activity there is within the country.  
 
MAS - Masculinity vs femininity 
Masculinity – femininity dimension refers to the distribution of values between genders. In masculine societies 
emotional gender roles are distinct. The women in feminine countries have the same modest, caring values as 
the men. In masculine countries women are somewhat assertive and competitive, but not as much as men, so 
that these countries show a gap between men’s and women’s values. In masculine societies people admire the 
strong and work prevails family, as opposed to feminine societies in which people have sympathy for the weak 
and there is a balance between family and work. In masculine countries men are expected to be assertive and 
ambitious and boys are not allowed to cry and express their feelings although girls are, and boys are expected 
to fight back. In masculine countries there are only few women in elected political positions as opposed to 
feminine countries. (Hofstede, 2011) In masculine countries there are also relatively more people living below 
the poverty line and relatively a larger percentage of people that cannot read and write than in feminine 
countries. (Youtube, 10 minutes with Geert Hofstede on Masculinity versus Femininity, 2014) 
Masculinity is high in Japan, in German speaking countries and in some Latin countries such as Italy and 
Mexico. It is moderately high in English speaking Western countries and it is low in Nordic countries and in 
the Netherlands. It is moderately low in some culturally Latin and Asian countries such as France, Spain, 
Portugal, Chile, Korea and Thailand. (Hofstede, 2011) 
I conclude that due to distinct and restrictive gender roles and the strict expectations and pressure in masculine 
countries there are fewer possibilities for both women and men to perform well in the society. This leads to 
less entrepreneurial activity and VC activity. Supposing that, since people and the labor markets do not work 
as efficiently as they could, the economy and the financial markets also suffer from more inefficiency.  
Based on previous literature and the above explained argumentation, I conduct a hypothesis: 
H3: Hypothesis 3. The higher the level of masculinity, the less VC activity there is within the country. 
 
UAI – Uncertainty avoidance index  
Uncertainty avoidance index is defined as the extent to which the members of a culture feel uncomfortable and 
threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity. Societies with high uncertainty avoidance see uncertainty in life as a 
continuous threat that must be fought. Due to this these societies have created beliefs and institutions that try 
to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity. Intolerance towards deviant persons and ideas, the view that “what is 
different is dangerous” is a characteristic trait of an uncertainty avoiding culture. (Hofstede, 2011) 
“Uncertainty avoidance indicates low tolerance for risk-taking activities such as VC investment and raises the 
opportunity costs of risk-taking.” (Li and Zahra, 2012) 
Uncertainty avoidance indices tend to be higher in East and Central European countries, in Latin countries, in 
Japan and German speaking countries. Uncertainty avoidance tends to be lower in English speaking, Nordic 
and culturally Chinese countries. (Hofstede, 2011) 
Based on previous literature, I conduct a hypothesis: 
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H4: Hypothesis 4. The higher the level of uncertainty avoidance, the less VC activity there is within the 
country. 
 
LTOWVS – Long term orientation versus short term normative orientation 
The long-term – short-term dimension reflects the connection of the past and the current and future actions 
and challenges within a society. (Hofstede Insights, 2018) Normative, short-term oriented societies that score 
low on this dimension prefer to maintain time-honored traditions and norms while viewing societal change 
with suspicion. (Hofstede Insights, 2018) According to Hofstede’s research (Hofstede 2011) long-term 
oriented societies want to learn from other countries. They are also ready to adapt traditions and tolerate 
opposing truths. They see good and evil as relative and there are no fixed norms, but norms depend on the 
situation. In long-term oriented societies common sense and choosing the middle way is encouraged. 
(Hofstede, 2011) 
Long-term oriented are East Asian countries, followed by Eastern and Central Europe. A medium-term 
orientation is found in South- and North-European and South Asian countries. Short-term oriented are U.S.A. 
and Australia, Latin American, African and Muslim countries. 
In long-term oriented countries thrift and perseverance are important goals. There is also a large savings quote 
and funds available for investment as opposed to short-term oriented countries in which social spending and 
consumption are relatively more pronounced than saving and investing. (Hofstede, 2011) 
Since long-term oriented societies seem to encourage learning and forward-looking mentality, acceptance of 
the new and change of traditions, I therefore conclude that long-term oriented countries are more capable of 
producing innovations and startups. Countries that score high in long-term orientation are more ready and 
accepting towards societal and technological change and therefore are able to create larger venture capital 
markets.  
Based on the argumentation above, I conduct I hypothesis: 
H5: Hypothesis 5. The higher the level of long-term orientation, the more VC activity there is within the 
country.  
 
IVR – Indulgence versus restraint 
The indulgence versus restraint dimension reflects the “extent to which people try to control their desires and 
impulses, based on the way they were raised”. (Hofstede Insights, 2018) A society with high indulgence 
“allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human drives related to enjoying life and having fun”. 
A society on the restraint side of the dimension “suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by means of 
strict social norms.” (Hofstede, 2011) 
In indulgence-oriented societies higher percentage of people declare themselves very happy, as opposed to 
restrained societies in which there are fewer very happy people. Leisure has a higher importance in indulgence-
oriented countries. In restrained countries there is a perception of helplessness within the society: “what 
happens to me is not my own doing”. In indulgence-oriented societies leisure is valued more than in restrained 
societies. (Hofstede, 2011) 
According to Hofstede’s extensive research, indulgence tends to prevail in South and North America, in 
Western Europe and in parts of Sub-Sahara Africa. Restraint prevails in Eastern Europe, in Asia and in the 
Muslim world.  Mediterranean Europe takes a middle position on this dimension. (Hofstede, 2011) 
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Based on previous literature, I cannot make solid argumentation to form a hypothesis about the effect of 
indulgence on VC activity. Since IVR is still part of the cultural framework of Hofstede, I still include it as an 
explanative variable in my regressions and analyze its influence on VC activity. 
All in all, according to Holden (2002), Hofstede’s cultural dimensions “give a powerful, empirically developed 
framework for explaining cross-cultural differences. The multidimensional model maps and cross-references 
cultural traits across several countries.” 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
4.1. Data, variables and methodology 
I test my hypotheses using data collected from the SDC Platinum VentureXpert database provided by Thomson 
Reuters Financial. This dataset provides the most comprehensive coverage of VC activity in the world.2 I focus 
my analysis on a solid 10-year period between years 2007 and 2016. This is because, in most emerging 
economies VC activity has only gained significance starting from after the millennium. 
I use two measures to capture the level of VC activity in a country. The first is the total number of VC deals 
executed during the time period 2007-2016 in that country. The second measure is the total amount in dollars 
of the VC deals in a country. I use the second measure for VC activity for robustness checks. In all of the 
regressions, I focus on deals in which there are either one or several venture capitalists (either VC firms or 
funds) that represent the same national culture as the startup company receiving finance. I include solely these 
domestic, “unicultural” deals, so that the national culture with its dimensions is expected to be represented in 
the deal. Therefore, I leave out the fully cross-border deals, in which all the VCs in the deal represent different 
national cultures than the portfolio company. 
My sample consists of approximately 41 920 venture capital deals inside up to 67 countries. (See appendix 1 
for the individual values of the countries.) Table 1 presents all the variables I use in the regression models and 
their sources. 
I perform a regression analysis using the number of VC deals as the explicable variable and the cultural 
dimensions as explanative variables and use several control variables to ensure the robustness of the results. I 
perform 8 different models and 4 robustness check models. 
 
                                                          
2 Since the definition of VC varies across countries and databases (Baygan and Freudenberg, 2000) I decide to use data solely from 
VentureXpert to ensure data consistency over time and across countries. Nonetheless, the data of VentureXpert has been compared 
with data from European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and it has been found that the number and amount of investments are 
highly correlated across these databases (Li and Zahra, 2012). 
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4.2. Descriptive statistics 
I assess the data that is used in the regression and their descriptive statistics so that we can assess whether the 
prerequisites of regression analysis are met. 
The descriptive statistics for the countries and all the variables used in the regressions are presented in Table 
2. The table presents the descriptive statistics of the explanative variables (the six cultural dimensions), the 
dependent variables (number and sum amount of VC deals) and the control variables. The indicator variables, 
(Legal origin and Western world, which is used in the robustness checks) are not included in the table, since 
they are binary indicator variables with no means etc. Table 2 shows that the means of the cultural dimensions 
in this sample range between 46 to 66 depending on the cultural dimension. We see that the standard deviation 
is typically ca. 22. 
The mean of the number of unicultural VC deals per country during the 10-year time period is 613. The median 
is, however, only 33, meaning that there are several countries with only a couple of VC deals per year in the 
dataset. The minimum is 1 and the maximum is an outstanding 19 666, which represents the United States. 
The standard deviation is 2464, which is relatively high, mainly caused by the exceptionally high amount of 
VC deals executed in the outlier country United States. (The outlier position of United States can be best seen 
in Appendices 2 and 3). 
 
 
Table 1. List of country-based variables
Variable Definition Source
Number of VC deals
Dependent variable; sum of number of 
unicultural deals executed during years 
2007-2016
VentureXpert database in 
Thomson Reuters SDC
Sum amount of VC deals
Dependent variable; sum of the dollar 
amount of unicultural deals executed 
during years 2007-2016
VentureXpert database in 
Thomson Reuters SDC
Six cultural dimensions (pdi, idv, mas, 
uai, ltowvs, ivr)
Explanatory variables; cultural 
dimensions produced by a global survey 
to IBM employees around the world
Hofstede, 2001; 
www.geerthofstede.com 
GDP
Average gross domestic product during 
years 2007-2016 World Bank
Population
Average population during years 2007-
2016 World Bank
Legal origin
The legal origin of the country. British 
law, French law, Soviet law, 
Scandinacian law, German law being the 
omitted variable La Porta et al, 1999
Equity market capitalization
The equity market capiltalization; end of 
year values converted to U.S. dollars World Bank
Political stability and absence of vioelence 
and terrorism
Rank according to the estimate of 
governance. Percentile rank ranges from 
0 lowest to 100 highest rank. Average 
rank during the time period 2007-2016
WGI (World Governance 
Indicators) World Bank
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To assess, whether the cultural dimensions are normally distributed or not, I present their histograms. The 
histograms for all the cultural dimensions are represented in Figures 2-7. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of all variables
Variable Mean Std Min Median Max
PDI 57.4 21.3 11 60.5 104
IDV 48.7 23.3 13 47 91
MAS 48.9 21.4 5 50 110
UAI 65.7 23.8 8 69 112
LTOWVS 51.5 21.8 13.1 51 100
IVR 45.8 21.0 0 45.9 97
Number of VC deals 613 2464 1 33 19666
Sum of VC deals 
(thousands USD) 24941972 110496678 263 1483454 727748575
GDP 1.17E+12 2.49E+12 2.29E+10 3.15E+11 1.61E+13
Population 94408682 247661894 527397 21362282 1347786500
Equity market 
capitalization 6.75E+11 2.16E+12 1.29E+09 1.22E+11 1.43E+13
Political stability and 
absence of violence 
and terrorism 60.2 27.6 1.2 65.3 97.8
Figure 2. The distribution of Power 
Distance across the sample countries.  
Figure 3. The distribution of Individualism 
across the sample countries. 
 
Figure 4. The distribution of Masculinity 
across the sample. 
Figure 5. The distribution of Uncertainty 
avoidance across the sample. 
 
Figure 6. The distribution of Long-term 
orientation across the sample. 
 
Figure 7. The distribution of Indulgence 
across the sample. 
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From the histogram figures it can be seen that most of the cultural dimensions seem to be distributed rather 
evenly, resembling a somewhat normal distribution. Mostly just individualism and uncertainty avoidance strike 
off as not being so evenly or normally distributed. 
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients between all the explanative variables, cultural dimensions. 
Multicollinearity would exist, if the independent variables would be highly correlated (r > 0.9 (Pallant, 2007)). 
It is shown in the table 3 that there is no high correlation between the variables. The highest correlation exists 
between power distance and individualism (-0.65). It is a relatively high correlation, but not too high to be 
used in research. The other correlation coefficients are relatively low. 
 
(Appendix 4 shows the correlation coefficients between all the variables in this regression analysis.) 
Figure 8 presents the histograms of the Number of VC deals per country. From the figure, it can be seen that 
VC activity varies substantially across the countries in the sample. Furthermore, there are a few countries with 
a notably high VC activity, such as Canada, China, France, Germany, India, United Kingdom and United 
States. Assessing the scatter plot charts presenting correlation between each cultural dimension and the 
Number of VC deals (dependent variable) I find that the United States and China represent outliers in the 
dataset. (The scatter plot charts of correlation can be seen in Appendices 5-10.) 
 
 
As the previous analysis of variables shows, narrowly interpreted the prerequisites to perform a regression 
analysis do not strictly speaking hold. This is because, not all of the cultural dimensions are normally or even 
evenly distributed and the correlation coefficients between the cultural dimensions and the dependent variable 
(Number of VC deals) are relatively small (See Appendix 4). In addition, as we see from Figure 8, the number 
of VC deals varies significantly across countries, and this measure is also not normally distributed. However, 
the results of the analyses are very convincing in the sense of data analysis in terms of statistics. 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients between the six different cultural dimensions
pdi idv mas uai ltowvs ivr
pdi 1
idv -0.65 1
mas 0.18 0.05 1
uai 0.20 -0.24 0.02 1
ltowvs 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.01 1
ivr -0.36 0.30 0.03 -0.16 -0.49 1
Figure 8. The Number of VC deals per country in histograms. *Note that United States in fact should have a taller 
histogram, but the graph was modified so that the differences between rest of the countries could be seen better. 
There were 19 666 VC deals executed in the USA during the time period.  
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5. Results 
In this section I examine the influence of six cultural dimensions on VC activity. Subsequently I examine how 
significant the control variables are in explaining the varying VC activity across countries.  
In Section 5.1. I present the formula for the basic regression model. In section 5.2 I present the results of 8 
different regression model. In section 5.3. I assess the robustness of the results in three different ways and four 
regression models. 
5.1. Regression models 
The regression model 8 (See Table 4) is built as below: 
𝑌(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝐶 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠)
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐿𝑎𝑤 +  𝛽4 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝐿𝑎𝑤 
+  𝛽5 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑎𝑤 +  𝛽6 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑤 +  𝛽7 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝 
+  𝛽8 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽9 𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 +  𝛽10 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒎 
+  𝛽11 𝑴𝒂𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒚 +  𝛽12 𝑼𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒚 𝑨𝒗𝒐𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 +  𝛽13 𝑳𝒐𝒏𝒈
− 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎 𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 +  𝛽14 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 
In the model, β stands for the coefficient of each variable. 
5.2. Regression results 
In this section, I present the results of 8 different regression models. All the models have Number of VC deals 
as the dependent variable, and GDP, Population, Legal origin and Political stability as controls. In models 1-
6, every regression has only one cultural dimension as an explanative variable. Model 1 has Power Distance 
Index (PDI) as the explanative variable, model 2 has Individualism (IDV) and so on. 
In models 7 and 8, I include all six cultural dimensions included as explanative variables. I must use two 
different subsamples for models 7 and 8. This is due to the incomplete data on equity market capitalization in 
World Bank database. In model 7, I use a larger sample of 54 countries without equity market capitalization 
as a control variable. In model 8, I use a slightly smaller sample of 45 countries and include equity market 
capitalization as a control variable. Table 4 presents the regression results for models 1-8. The first estimate 
shown in a cell represents the coefficient of the variable in the model. The estimate above it in brackets 
represents the p-value for the coefficient in the model. Significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by 
*, ** and ***, respectively. Additionally, a notation for “nearly statistically significant”, meaning a 
significance level of 15% is added and noted by +. 
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From Table 4, I see that the most significant cultural dimension is masculinity (MAS). In all models, in which 
masculinity is included (models 3, 7 and 8) the coefficient of masculinity is negative, ca. -12. The negative 
coefficient implies that hypothesis 3 seems to hold. This means that the more feminine the culture is, the more 
VC activity there is in the country. Furthermore, the p-value in model 7 is 0.09, which indicates a significance 
level of 10% which is almost statistically significant. In models 3 and 8 the p-values are also within the 15% 
significance level. The result is in line with the implication of Aggarwal and Goodell (2014). 
Moreover, I find some evidence supporting hypothesis 4. The negative coefficient of uncertainty avoidance 
(UAI) in models 4, 7 and 8 implies some orientation towards hypothesis 4. The result is in line with Li and 
Zahra’s (2012) results implying that the higher the level of uncertainty avoidance in a country, the less there 
is VC activity. The results for UAI, are however, not statistically significant. 
The results for the effect of individualism (IDV) are slightly controversial. In model 2, in which IDV is the 
only cultural dimension, the coefficient of IDV is -0.68. This is against hypothesis 2, since it implies, that the 
more collectivist the country is, the more there is VC activity. However, once we add the rest of the cultural 
dimensions in the model (models 7 and 8), the coefficient of IDV is positive. This is in line with hypothesis 2 
and the results of Li and Zahra (2012).  
 
Table 4. Regression results for models 1-8.
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
PDI -5.092 0.557 -3.509
(0.459) (0.955) (0.702)
IDV -0.685 2.588 0.063
(0.917) (0.762) (0.994)
MAS -10.192+ -13.168* -11.752+
(0.128) (0.088) (0.106)
UAI -0.120 -5.859 -8.134
(0.987) (0.426) (0.258)
LTOWVS -9.523+ -17.552* -6.305
(0.109) (0.056) (0.479)
IVR -1.579 -5.338 1.550
(0.783) (0.531) (0.855)
GDP 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.063)
Population 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000+
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.033) (0.131)
British Law 1839*** 1822*** 1665*** 1811*** 1337*** 1739*** 750 123
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.306) (0.856)
French Law 1268** 1191** 998** 1189** 895* 1253*** 388 411
(0.010) (0.014) (0.038) (0.014) (0.052) (0.004) (0.557) (0.452)
Soviet Law 1502*** 1389*** 1173** 1360*** 1301*** 1378*** 730.6 963.1+
(0.003) (0.004) (0.016) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.265) (0.102)
Scandinavian Law 1517** 1576** 1007+ 1560** 1156** 1607*** -41.5 -190.5
(0.012) (0.011) (0.139) (0.018) (0.040) (0.002) (0.964) (0.822)
Political stability 0.268 1.626 1.993 1.449 3.220 1.714 4.317 1.913
(0.960) (0.782) (0.693) (0.791) (0.447) (0.691) (0.518) (0.774)
Equity market capitalization 0.000***
(0.000)
Number of observations 55 55 55 54 67 67 54 45
Adjusted R Square 0.904 0.917 0.907 0.903 0.908 0.904 0.906 0.952
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
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The results for the effect of power distance (PDI) raise some questions too. In models 1 and 8 the coefficient 
of PDI is negative, which supports hypothesis 1. This implies, that the lower the power distance is in a country, 
the more VC activity there is in that country. However, in model 7, the coefficient of PDI is positive, which 
implies the contrary. These results are not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, I find that surprisingly, long-term orientation (LTOWVS) seems to correlate negatively with VC 
activity. This is against hypothesis 5. In all models, in which LTOWVS is included (models 5, 7 and 8) the 
coefficient of LTOWVS is negative, ranging between -6.3 and -17.6. Furthermore, in models 7 and 5 the p-
values indicate that LTOWVS is statistically significant within the 10% and 15% significance levels, 
respectively. This is against hypothesis 5, since it implies, that the more long-term oriented a country is, the 
less VC activity it has. 
Additionally, the results for the effect of indulgence (IVR) are also interesting. In models 6 and 7 the coefficient 
of IVR is negative. This would indicate, that the more restrained the culture is, the more VC activity there is 
in the country. However, once we add market capitalization to the model (model 8), the coefficient of IVR 
turns positive, indicating the contrary. 
It seems, that in addition to femininity and long-term orientation, some of the control variables could also be 
driving the results. Especially GDP, population and equity market capitalization seem to have a strong effect 
on national VC activity. 
Table 4 shows that GDP and Equity market capitalization have the strongest effects on VC activity in the 
models. The coefficient of GDP is very small and positive and the p-value is extremely small, which means 
that the result is statistically very significant. The coefficient of equity market capitalization in model 8 is 
positive and the p-value is extremely small (0.000002), meaning that the size of the stock market in a country 
predicts the size of the country’s VC market very well. 
Additionally, population has a negative coefficient in models 1-7. This indicates that countries with larger 
populations tend to have less VC activity. The p-values of population in models 1-7 indicate that the results 
are statistically significant at levels 1% and 5%. This could indicate that less developed countries with larger 
populations have less VC activity. However, in model 8, the coefficient of population is slightly positive. 
The results for the effect of legal origins on VC activity, show that Soviet Law and British Law have the 
strongest influences.  In all of the models German Law is the omitted variable. The coefficient of British Law 
(750) indicates, that as opposed to countries with German Law origins, countries with British Law origins 
seem to have 750 times larger venture capital activity. This is mainly due to the impact of the United States in 
the dataset. However, once equity market capitalization is included in the model 8, the significance of British 
law decreases dramatically to a coefficient of 123. I conclude, that the significance of British law in model 7 
was due to the capital market based financial system that is common in British law countries and provides a 
functional exit system for VCs, rather than the legal system itself. 
In model 8 Soviet Law seems to provide the best platform for VC activity (coefficient 963 and p-value 0.102, 
which indicates a significance of 15%). The strong positive effect of Soviet law is mainly due to the influence 
of China’s large amount of VC deals. The French Law origins also produce more venture capital activity than 
countries with German Law origin. Countries with Scandinavian Law origins seem to have lower level of 
venture capital activity compared to all other countries. 
The results for the effect of political stability and absence of violence and terrorism indicate that the more 
stable the country is politically, the more there is VC activity. The results are, however, not statistically 
significant. 
All in all, the Adjusted R Squares of the estimated models are all roughly 0.91. This demonstrates the validity 
of the models. However, they raise the question of multicollinearity between the variables. 
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5.3. Robustness checks 
I address robustness by running the regressions in four new regression models (models 9-12). The results of 
the robustness checks are presented in Table 5. 
 
In model 9, I replace the dependent variable number of deals by their sum amount value in US dollars (deal 
volume). The results for model 9 remain similar when it comes to the cultural dimensions. The directions/ 
signs of the coefficients of the cultural dimensions remain same, apart from individualism. When sum of VC 
deals is used as the dependent variable, the coefficient for IDV is negative, meaning that the more collectivist 
the culture is, the more VC activity there is in that country. (This could be because of China, and its large sum 
amount of VC deals and the collectivist culture of China). Furthermore, the significance of feminine culture 
decreases, as the p-value of MAS increases from 0.09 to 0.58, meaning that the result is not robust to this 
robustness check. In model 9 Soviet Law becomes almost statistically significant (p-value 0.006) to produce 
larger VC markets than the omitted variable German Law. Other than that, the results remain similar. 
Table 5. Regression results for robustness checks, models 9-12
9 10 11 12
PDI -549362+ 0.677 4.790 6.005
(0.117) (0.894) (0.358) (0.576)
IDV -584035* 4.286 9.634* 0.924
(0.072) (0.339) (0.053) (0.914)
MAS -153797 -5.935+ -6.851* -13.874*
(0.584) (0.144) (0.080) (0.072)
UAI -416688+ -2.488 -0.372 -7.072
(0.144) (0.516) (0.921) (0.338)
LTOWVS -320393 -0.892 -0.180 -16.091*
(0.362) (0.857) (0.970) (0.080)
IVR 126789 1.505 0.971 -10.239
(0.698) (0.737) (0.820) (0.277)
GDP 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.526) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population 0.059** 0.000+ 0.000 0.000**
(0.040) (0.108) (0.562) (0.033)
British Law 15797921 300 142 702
(0.539) (0.433) (0.700) (0.336)
French Law 36287787* 152 -149 116
(0.098) (0.658) (0.673) (0.867)
Soviet Law 66389425*** 221 -217 340
(0.006) (0.520) (0.567) (0.638)
Scandinavian Law 12364454 -44.03 -264.1 -98.80
(0.705) (0.928) (0.575) (0.915)
Political stability 103810 2.553 0.520 1.663
(0.674) (0.463) (0.879) (0.811)
Equity market capitalization 0.000***
(0.000)
Western (cultural) 588.2
(0.226)
Number of observations 45 53 52 54
Adjusted R Square 0.944 0.726 0.497 0.931
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
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As another robustness check I exclude the outliers, USA and China which are shown in section 4.2 and 
Appendices 2 and 3. In model 10, I only exclude USA, which is the most outstanding outlier. The biggest 
takeaway from the results is, that the sign of the coefficient of indulgence versus restraint changes to positive 
from negative. This indicates, that USA was driving the positive effect related to restrained culture. 
Additionally, when we exclude United States from the model, the coefficient of long-term orientation collapses 
from -18 to -0.9. This indicates that the superiority of the short-term oriented culture is explained by United 
States and its high dominance in the VC dataset. When USA is excluded, it seems that a culture with high 
indulgence produces more VC activity. The p-value of IVR (0.74) however, indicates that the result is not 
statistically significant. In model 11, I exclude both USA and China. The results of model 11 indicate 
femininity to be even more strongly associated with more VC activity (p-value decreases from 0.09 to 0.08, 
significant at 10% level). Furthermore, in model 11, the best legal origins seem to be British Law and German 
Law, although the results for legal origins are not statistically significant. 
In the third robustness model, model 12, I add a western country indicator variable. There are different types 
of definitions of the “western world”; cultural definition (Latin West), political definition (Cold War West) 
and the economic definition (The Rich West) (Trubetskoy, 2017). I will not use the economic definition, since 
the economic aspects should be already taken into account in the model since GDP and Equity market 
capitalization are included. Furthermore, an indicator for political stability and legal origin are already included 
in the model. Therefore, I choose to use the cultural definition for the western indicator. The regression results 
in model 12 remain robust and the coefficients of different variables remain similar. The p-values for the legal 
origin indicators and political stability increase slightly, meaning that their significance decreases. Conversely, 
the p-value for femininity (mas) decreases from 0.09 to 0.07 meaning that the significance of feminine culture 
increases when the cultural western indicator is added. All in all, the p-values of the cultural dimensions are 
not much affected by adding the western indicator. The coefficient of the western indicator is positive, and its 
p-value is as 0.2.  
All in all, the cultural dimension that is robust is femininity which is positively related to VC activity. In fact, 
the significance of femininity increases, when the dimensions are tested in different subsamples with the 
western dummy included and the outliers excluded. The effect of femininity is robust to two out of the three 
robustness checks. Overall, these measures lead to quite comparable, but slightly different results and slightly 
higher significance for some of the cultural dimensions. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have analyzed the influence of national culture on domestic VC activity through a regression 
analysis. I have measured national culture by Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions and VC activity with the 
number of unicultural VC deals executed during 2007-2016. 
The key takeaway from the results is, that the lower the country scores in masculinity, the more VC activity 
there is in the country. The result is almost statistically significant and is robust to two of the three robustness 
checks. The result is in line with the results of Aggarwal and Goodell (2014) who find that in feminine societies 
access to VC finance is better than in masculine societies.  
The rather robust result of the relationship between feminine culture and increased VC activity has implications 
related to cultural values, gender roles and stance towards equality in the society. In feminine cultures gender 
roles are less pronounced, more women are elected in powerful positions, and equality and taking care of the 
weak is an important value in the society. Because of this, it is expected that in masculine cultures women and 
the less advantaged people of the society have less opportunities to obtain higher education or initiate 
innovative ventures and receive financing for them. As a result, less innovative ventures are initiated in 
masculine countries than feminine countries. This could be causing a loss in the utilization of potential in the 
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society. Therefore, the labor and entrepreneur markets are expected to have more inefficiencies in masculine 
countries than in feminine countries, when it comes to genders and the weaker social classes.  
One might conclude, that this impact would be driven by the fact that more developed and western countries, 
are often also more equal and feminine in their culture, and they have more developed VC markets. However, 
once the western indicator variable is included, the significance of feminine culture in fact only increases. 
Furthermore, the results suggest, that high power distance and uncertainty avoidance are negatively associated 
with more VC activity. The result of the relation between uncertainty avoidance and VC activity is in line with 
the results of Li and Zahra (2012) and Aggarwal and Goodell (2014). The connection between high power 
distance and low VC activity is presumably caused by the fewer interactions and encounters between young 
and less wealthy entrepreneurs and more wealthy and powerful venture capitalists. In countries with high PDI, 
it is presumably also less common, that people with less power will aspire to initiate ventures and approach 
people with power and financial resources. Furthermore, the relation between uncertainty avoidance and less 
VC activity is explained by the low tolerance for risk-taking activities such as VC investment and increased 
opportunity costs of risk-taking, which are characteristic traits of uncertainty avoiding cultures. 
The signs of the regression coefficients for the cultural dimensions are in line with the hypotheses, except for 
long-term orientation. The coefficients for long-term orientation are negative, inclining that countries that are 
more short-term oriented have a higher level of VC activity. This is counter-intuitive, since one would think 
that a country that has a long-term orientation and is willing to learn from other countries and change traditions, 
would be more entrepreneurial and open towards innovation, which would support VC and startup activity. 
Short-term orientation seems to produce more VC activity, and what is more, the result is almost statistically 
significant. I find, that United States with its short-term oriented culture and exceptional amount of VC deals 
is driving the superiority of short-term oriented culture.  
It must be emphasized that the purpose of this paper is not, however, to denigrate any cultures or rank them in 
an unethical way. The results of this paper, however, indicate, that some cultural dimensions support the 
development of entrepreneurial activity and access to venture capital finance better than others. This paper 
seeks to outline the implications of culture on VC activity and the possibilities in developing venture capital 
financing. This study could support the development of VC activity also in countries in which it is relatively 
weak now. 
Since most of the results are not statistically significant, and the results vary among the different models, there 
is still room for further research on the subject. 
According to previous literature and this study, there are several different variables influencing the 
development of VC markets and VC activity. It is indeed difficult to precisely sort out the effects of the cultural 
dimensions and other determinants affecting VC activity. It would be difficult to build a model that would take 
into account all the different determinants that affect both entrepreneurial and innovative activity and access 
to VC finance. Additionally, many of those determinants influence each other, and are therefore intertwined. 
There would be significant multicollinearity. Therefore, adding all the variables to the model would probably 
just cause the model to be over-explanatory. In my models, it also seems that the cultural dimensions influence 
on some of the controls, such as equity market capitalization and GDP. Therefore, it would be beneficial to 
examine the determinants of VC activity through path analysis. (Sarwoko et al., 2016 and McAdam et al., 
2010) By using path coefficients one can define the individual effects of certain variables and construct 
influence networks. 
 21 
 
 
 
 
Building on Figure 1, in Figure 9 I illustrate the scientifically discussed and proven, and possible, yet 
unestablished determinants of VC activity. The thicker arrows illustrate the relations that have been discussed 
in previous literature or this paper and an almost significant or significant effect has been found between these 
variables. The sources of the discussed and proven connections are in the table next to the framework. The 
thinner arrows represent relations that are possible but require further examination to be established. The 
relations between variables, especially the ones that are still undiscovered, could be analyzed more rigorously 
using path analysis to conduct an impact network. 
 
7. Limitations, data problems and future research directions 
The regression results raise several questions which require attention in future research. Particularly, the 
viability of the dependent variable Number of VC deals is constrained by the data available at Thomson Reuters 
SDC VentureXpert database. The assumed incompleteness of the database could be causing a selection bias to 
the results. The large amount of deals made in the United States and the Western countries could be pronounced 
in the dataset, especially, in case not all deals made in the developing economies have been reported for the 
database of the North American corporation. 
Another limitation is the syndication of VC deals. I study all the VC deals from the database that have at least 
one local VC that represents the same nationality (and national culture) as the company receiving finance. 
However, as seen from my dataset, many of the syndication VC deals also include foreign VCs, in addition to 
the local VC, and even the lead VC is sometimes a foreign VC. This might set limitations to the extent by 
which the national culture of the company receiving finance is demonstrated in the deal-making and investment 
process. However, excluding the deals with foreign VCs involved would also limit the dataset excessively. For 
Figure 9. An illustration of the discussed and possible determinants of VC activity and their relations 
with each other and the two major determinants of VC activity. 
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future research, however, it might be interesting to see, if the effect of national culture would be more 
significant if only the deals with solely domestic VCs involved would be included in the regression. 
When it comes to the explanative variables, there are several issues to consider. Firstly, the cultural dimensions 
of Hofstede have been criticized. However, it seems that dimensions are widely used for the following reasons: 
the measures are based on data from 53 developed and developing countries and subsequent studies indicate 
significant correlations with these dimensions when replicated (Hoppe, 1990 and Sondergaard 1994). 
Moreover, country scores are validated when compared with data from other surveys and indices measured at 
country level (e.g. GNP). 
Additionally, the research focuses on country-level factors, such as national culture, national GDP and 
national-level political stability. However, there can be significant regional differences within the same country 
when it comes to these variables, and VC activity may also vary regionally. (see e.g. Tabellini, 2010) Using 
data aggregated at the country level might hide these important differences at both the regional and 
organizational levels. Hence, future research would benefit from studying the impact of regional and 
organizational differences of the heterogeneity of VC activity within a country. 
Furthermore, there is a problem with the equity market capitalization data. At the time when this thesis is 
produced the official database of World Bank only has a large and sufficient dataset for equity market 
capitalization from the year 2003. For some countries it has more recent data (e.g. 2016 and 2017) but several 
important countries that I wanted to include in the analysis are missing for the more recent years. Due to this, 
I decide to run regressions with a smaller sample with the equity market capitalization data from the year 2003 
and run a second set of regressions with a larger sample without the equity market capitalization as a control 
variable. 
Since according to earlier research (Urban, 2007), entrepreneurship can be seen as an interaction between 
personality and cultural values, future research could try and include personality traits as explanative variables 
to explain entrepreneurial activity. Future research could also further inspect the two major determinants of 
VC activity, which are entrepreneurial activity and innovative ventures and access to venture capital financing. 
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9. Appendix 
 
     
Regression analysis Y
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
Company Nation
British 
Law
French 
Law
Soviet 
Law
Scandin
av Law pdi idv mas uai ltowvs ivr
Argentina 13 4.7E+11 4.2E+07 0 1 0 0 3.5E+10 46.19 49 46 56 86 20 62
Australia 350 1.2E+12 2.3E+07 1 0 0 0 5.86E+11 80.48 38 90 61 51 21 71
Austria 99 4.1E+11 8.5E+06 0 0 0 0 5.65E+10 92.15 11 55 79 70 60 63
Belgium 220 5.0E+11 1.1E+07 0 1 0 0 1.74E+11 71.84 65 75 54 94 82 57
Brazil 200 2.1E+12 2.0E+08 0 1 0 0 2.35E+11 39.74 69 38 49 76 44 59
Bulgaria 8 5.3E+10 7.3E+06 0 0 1 0 1.76E+09 53.90 70 30 40 85 69 16
Canada 2220 1.6E+12 3.5E+07 1 0 0 0 9.1E+11 88.14 39 80 52 48 36 68
Chile 6 2.3E+11 1.7E+07 0 1 0 0 8.65E+10 61.28 63 23 28 86 31 68
China 4721 7.8E+12 1.3E+09 0 0 1 0 5.13E+11 27.76 80 20 66 30 87 24
Croatia 2 5.9E+10 4.3E+06 0 0 1 0 6.13E+09 66.90 73 33 40 80 58 33
Czech Republic 17 2.1E+11 1.0E+07 0 0 1 0 1.55E+10 84.09 57 58 57 74 70 29
Denmark 270 3.3E+11 5.6E+06 0 0 0 1 1.22E+11 82.21 18 74 16 23 35 70
Finland 377 2.6E+11 5.4E+06 0 0 0 1 1.7E+11 95.62 33 63 26 59 38 57
France 2517 2.7E+12 6.5E+07 0 1 0 0 1.36E+12 60.57 68 71 43 86 63 48
Germany 1632 3.6E+12 8.1E+07 0 0 0 0 1.08E+12 74.68 35 67 66 65 83 40
Ghana 1 3.6E+10 2.5E+07 1 0 0 0 6.4E+08 45.46 #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! 4 72
Greece 14 2.7E+11 1.1E+07 0 1 0 0 1.07E+11 43.71 60 35 57 112 45 50
Hong Kong 51 2.6E+11 7.1E+06 1 0 0 0 7.15E+11 83.36 68 25 57 29 61 17
Hungary 16 1.3E+11 9.9E+06 0 0 1 0 1.67E+10 69.15 46 80 88 82 58 31
India 1300 1.7E+12 1.3E+09 1 0 0 0 2.79E+11 12.91 77 48 56 40 51 26
Indonesia 20 7.6E+11 2.5E+08 0 1 0 0 5.47E+10 23.26 78 14 46 48 62 38
Ireland 205 2.5E+11 4.6E+06 1 0 0 0 8.51E+10 82.74 28 70 68 35 24 65
Israel 491 2.6E+11 7.8E+06 1 0 0 0 7.02E+10 12.81 13 54 47 81 38 #NULL!
Italy 345 2.1E+12 6.0E+07 0 1 0 0 6.15E+11 61.05 50 76 70 75 61 30
Japan 800 5.2E+12 1.3E+08 0 0 0 0 2.95E+12 81.71 54 46 95 92 88 42
Luxembourg 11 5.7E+10 5.3E+05 0 1 0 0 3.73E+10 97.77 40 60 50 70 64 56
Malaysia 36 2.7E+11 2.9E+07 1 0 0 0 1.61E+11 49.62 104 26 50 36 41 57
Mexico 47 1.1E+12 1.2E+08 0 1 0 0 1.23E+11 22.52 81 30 69 82 24 97
Netherlands 317 8.5E+11 1.7E+07 0 1 0 0 4.89E+11 82.97 38 80 14 53 67 68
New Zealand 47 1.6E+11 4.4E+06 1 0 0 0 3.3E+10 95.57 22 79 58 49 33 75
Norway 162 4.5E+11 5.0E+06 0 0 0 1 9.59E+10 93.85 31 69 8 50 35 55
Peru 4 1.6E+11 3.0E+07 0 1 0 0 1.41E+10 22.76 64 16 42 87 25 46
Philippines 8 2.3E+11 9.6E+07 0 1 0 0 2.32E+10 11.80 94 32 64 44 27 42
Poland 161 4.9E+11 3.8E+07 0 0 1 0 3.7E+10 78.21 68 60 64 93 38 29
Portugal 108 2.3E+11 1.0E+07 0 1 0 0 5.83E+10 74.40 63 27 31 104 28 33
Romania 5 1.8E+11 2.0E+07 0 0 1 0 3.4E+09 52.71 90 30 42 90 52 20
Singapore 190 2.6E+11 5.2E+06 1 0 0 0 1.49E+11 94.62 74 20 48 8 72 46
Slovakia 8 9.3E+10 5.4E+06 0 0 1 0 1.29E+09 82.81 104 52 110 51 77 28
Slovenia 4 4.8E+10 2.0E+06 0 0 1 0 7.13E+09 81.55 71 27 19 88 49 48
South Africa 50 3.4E+11 5.3E+07 1 0 0 0 2.61E+11 43.96 #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! 34 63
South Korea 833 1.2E+12 5.0E+07 0 0 0 0 3.29E+11 56.92 60 18 39 85 100 29
Spain 625 1.4E+12 4.6E+07 0 1 0 0 7.26E+11 43.98 57 51 42 86 48 44
Sweden 610 5.2E+11 9.5E+06 0 0 0 1 2.9E+11 88.96 31 71 5 29 53 78
Switzerland 232 6.2E+11 8.0E+06 0 0 0 0 7.27E+11 95.66 34 68 70 58 74 66
Thailand 12 3.6E+11 6.8E+07 1 0 0 0 1.19E+11 12.91 64 20 34 64 32 45
Turkey 34 8.2E+11 7.4E+07 0 1 0 0 6.84E+10 14.10 66 37 45 85 46 49
United Kingdom 2096 2.7E+12 6.3E+07 1 0 0 0 2.43E+12 59.68 35 89 66 35 51 69
United States 19666 1.6E+13 3.1E+08 1 0 0 0 1.43E+13 63.61 40 91 62 46 26 68
Zambia 1 2.1E+10 1.5E+07 1 0 0 0 7.56E+08 59.51 #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! #NULL! 30 42
Legal origin
Control variables Explanative variables (cultural dimensions)
Number of 
VC deals 
(07-16)
GDP (Avg 
07-16)
Population 
(Avg 07-16)
Equity 
Market 
Cap 
(2003)
Political 
stability 
(Avg 07-
16)
Appendix 1. All values for the countries for all of the variables. 
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Number of VC deals GDP Population British French Soviet ScandinavEquity Market Cap (2003)Political stab pdi idv mas uai ltowvs ivr
Number of VC deals 1
GDP (Avg 07-16) 0.93602891 1
Population (Avg 07-16) 0.303298215 0.441881 1
British Law 0.283382733 0.197886 0.13202 1
French Law -0.155893199 -0.13218 -0.10234 -0.42249 1
Soviet Law -0.059637435 -0.0641 0.109551 -0.2844 -0.37139 1
Scandinavian Law -0.057736911 -0.11265 -0.11226 -0.17766 -0.23201 -0.15617 1
Equity Market Cap (2003) 0.957826798 0.901539 0.131587 0.298327 -0.14344 -0.14241 -0.073949 1
Political stability (Avg 07-16)-0.032765086 -0.1015 -0.44892 0.048403 -0.42548 0.053249 0.318415 0.03340883 1
pdi -0.118825511 -0.08461 0.241611 -0.08687 0.200985 0.373046 -0.408612 -0.1642545 -0.56336273 1
idv 0.290964444 0.239299 -0.16158 0.184253 -0.1913 -0.15244 0.251834 0.33354505 0.52374102 -0.67613 1
mas 0.10578011 0.223604 0.141288 0.119265 -0.12706 0.170542 -0.546733 0.15397507 -0.03463571 0.154036 0.132989 1
uai -0.187868957 -0.15335 -0.26542 -0.58161 0.452423 0.204521 -0.317332 -0.1294512 -0.17940136 0.154225 -0.19961 0.039739 1
ltowvs -0.084663352 0.065815 0.169612 -0.29907 -0.1886 0.263503 -0.172434 -0.0943498 0.19200371 0.127055 -0.08484 0.241681 0.022868 1
ivr 0.124186593 0.063388 -0.25144 0.187855 0.150168 -0.55606 0.268468 0.16846964 0.19398733 -0.50081 0.426052 -0.17244 -0.20064 -0.46886 1
Appendix 2. Histograms of the Number of VC deals per country, unedited version. The United States strikes off as an outlier 
with 19 666 VC deals during the 10-year period. 
Appendix 3. Histograms of the Sum amount of VC deals in thousands per country, unedited version. 
Appendix 4. Correlation coefficients between all the explanative and control variables and the dependent Y variable, 
Number of VC deals. 
 27 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5. The scatter plot chart 
of the correlation between PDI 
and Number of VC deals. 
Appendix 6. The scatter plot 
chart of the correlation between 
IDV and Number of VC deals. 
Appendix 7. The scatter plot 
chart of the correlation between 
MAS and Number of VC deals. 
Appendix 8. The scatter plot 
chart of the correlation between 
UAI and Number of VC deals. 
Appendix 9. The scatter plot chart 
of the correlation between 
LTOWVS and Number of VC deals. 
Appendix 10. The scatter plot 
chart of the correlation between 
IVR and Number of VC deals. 
